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How Sales Executives Can Avoid Accounting Fraud Allegations
Mark S. Beasley, North Carolina State University
Dana R. Hermanson, Kennesaw State University
Abstract

Revenue Recognition

Is accounting fraud only a concern for CEOs and financial
executives? This article discusses recent cases in which the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Sales
Vice Presidents for their role in accounting fraud. The
authors offer suggestions to help sales executives steer
clear of accounting fraud allegations.

Sales cannot be recorded in the accounting system
(“recognized”) until two conditions are met [5]: (1) the
company has provided the service or delivered the goods
under an existing arrangement with a fixed or determinable
price, and (2) the company has been paid or reasonably
expects to be paid. In other words, before it can be
recorded, the revenue has to be earned (the company has
done its part and met all of its obligations to the customer)
and realized or realizable (the company has collected cash
or will be able to turn the sale into cash). If sales are
recorded before both conditions are met, then the
company’s financial statements are not fairly stated. If the
misstatement of revenues is intentional, then the company
has committed fraud.

Introduction
Accounting fraud has dominated business headlines in
recent years. Companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Qwest,
Tyco, Adelphia, HealthSouth, and others have been
investigated for massive frauds, and many executives have
faced criminal charges. As a result of fraud, companies’
shareholders have lost billions, and investors’ faith in the
U.S. capital markets has been shaken. In response to the
spate of frauds, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX 2002), which provides tough new penalties for
those committing accounting fraud, including lengthy
prison terms [3]. In this environment, sales executives
should ask, “Do I need to worry about accounting fraud, or
do the SEC and federal prosecutors typically sanction only
CEOs and financial executives in fraud cases?”
This article explains the accounting rules for recording sales
(recognizing revenue) and discusses prior research on the
prevalence of revenue fraud in U.S. public companies. We
illustrate the role of sales executives in accounting fraud by
reviewing some recent SEC enforcement cases charging
Sales Vice Presidents with fraud. These cases often involve
sales executives overstating company sales, often by
creating “contingent sales” – transactions that give the
buyer the right to walk away with no penalty – that were
recorded by the company as fully-completed sales. Finally,
we discuss the tough new Sarbanes-Oxley penalties and
offer several suggestions to help sales executives minimize
the risk of trouble with the SEC and federal prosecutors.

Revenue-Based Accounting Fraud
The 1999 report, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 19871997, An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies [1], profiled
200 SEC accounting fraud cases and found that revenue
(sales) frauds accounted for 50 percent of all the frauds.
Within the group of revenue frauds, approximately half
involved recording legitimate sales too early (before the
revenues were earned or realizable), while the other half
involved recording fictitious sales.
More recently, the SEC’s Report Pursuant to Section 704 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [6] examined 227 enforcement cases
(many of which alleged fraud) from 1997-2002. The SEC
found that 56 percent of the cases in this later period involved
overstated revenues, so revenue misstatements continue to be
prevalent. The SEC report also noted that many revenue
misstatements involved recording sales too early.

If the misstatement of revenues is intentional, then the
company has committed fraud.
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The Role of Sales Executives in Recent Accounting
Frauds
To offer insights into the role of sales executives in recent
accounting frauds, we searched the SEC’s formal reports of
its enforcement actions – its Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) – for recent cases in which
Sales Vice Presidents were charged with fraud from
September of 2003 through mid-September of 2005
(available at http://www.sec.gov).1 In this recent two-year
period, we identified eight public company accounting fraud
cases in which at least one Sales Vice President was charged
by the SEC with violating the anti-fraud provisions of the
U.S. securities laws.2 The key elements of these cases, as
described by the SEC, are presented in the Exhibit. Note that
the information provided should be viewed as allegations,
and in many cases, the parties charged have not admitted
guilt. Some cases are still pending at this time.
Several interesting patterns are revealed in these cases.
First, the sample is dominated by technology/software
/internet firms – typically growth companies with intense
pressure to meet sales targets and analyst expectations.
Second, many of the eight cases involve companies
significantly overstating revenues by, among other methods,
intentionally creating contingent sales whereby the
companies improperly recorded sales when products were
shipped to customers before the customer was ready or
obligated to purchase the goods. These arrangements
sometimes were made through secret side letters that were
1 Specifically, we searched the SEC website using the following search
strings: “Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release” (or “Accounting
and Auditing Release”) AND [“Vice President of Sales” OR “Vice President
for Sales” OR “Sales Vice President”]. Our search strings will not identify
all cases against sales executives, so the sample of cases described in this
paper is smaller than the true population. For example, on May 17, 2004,
Lucent Technologies, Inc. settled an SEC enforcement case alleging that it
fraudulently overstated fiscal 2000 sales by over $1 billion. The Lucent
case involved securities fraud charges against nine company employees,
including several individuals with sales-related responsibilities [7]. This case
did not show up in our Sales VP searches.
2 We went only back to September of 2003 so as to keep the number of
cases profiled at a manageable number. Our intent is not to document all
recent SEC cases against sales professionals, but rather to provide insights
from a selection of recent cases.

unknown to others in the company, which allowed the
customer to withdraw from the transaction at a later date
or contained other contingencies/unusual terms. In one
instance, the SEC disclosed the text of the secret side letter
that invalidated the sale (Legato is the supplier, and Logicon
is the customer;
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18327.htm):
The order letter meets the GAP [sic] requirement 97-4
[sic] for revenue recognition. The order letter allows
Legato to recognize revenue for our third quarter
ending 9-30-99.... The order letter gives us 30 days to
reach mutually agreeable terms and conditions. In the
unlikely event that we do not reach “mutually
agreeable terms and conditions,” Logicon will have the
right to terminate the order letter and all obligations.
This contingency may not be expressly stated in the
order letter, because of the impact on revenue
recognition. However, you have my assurance that in
the event that we can not [sic] reach terms we will not
hold you to the commitment to pay referenced in the
order letter.
The company recorded the sale in its financial statements as
of September 30, 1999, even though the above side letter
clearly gave the customer the right to “undo” the
purported sale without penalty after that date. Amazingly,
the side letter even referred to the revenue recognition
issue and explained why this escape clause could not be
included in the actual order letter.

Fourth, the penalties imposed in these cases included such
elements as disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, civil fines, being
barred from serving as an officer or director of a public
company, and jail time in a case also involving insider trading
(some cases are still unresolved). Also, job loss is a common
outcome for those charged with accounting fraud.3
Finally, others were charged in all eight of these cases. Sales
executives typically do not act alone in committing
accounting fraud, but often are working in concert with
others, or are implementing fraud schemes directed by
higher-level personnel.
Criminal Penalties Under Sarbanes-Oxley
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act establishes a number of tough new
criminal penalties for fraud and related offenses, including:
(1) destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in
federal investigations – up to 20 years in prison; (2)
securities fraud – up to 25 years; (3) mail and wire fraud –
previous five-year penalties increased to up to 20 years; and
(4) failure of corporate officers to certify financial reports –
up to 20 years for willful misstatements. In addition, the
law extends the statute of limitations for securities fraud
and provides for enhanced protection of whistle-blowers
[3]. On the whole, since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the
stakes have been raised significantly for those engaged in
public company accounting fraud.

finance, are expected to understand (and are being held
legally accountable for understanding) the basics of revenue
recognition under generally accepted accounting principles,
or “GAAP.” Sales staff should appreciate that “playing
games” with sales can become accounting fraud.
• Culture. Do not understate the importance of the
organization’s culture (see COSO [2] for a discussion of the
“tone at the top”). If the culture in the organization is
“make your sales targets or you’re fired,” or, “we never
miss our sales forecasts,” then the company is much more
likely to have trouble with revenue recognition. Under such
pressure, people are more likely to push the envelope to
boost their sales numbers, perhaps by making contingent
sales to customers or recording fictitious sales. Such actions
to meet internal sales targets become accounting fraud

Public company executives, whether
in sales or finance, are…legally
accountable for understanding…the
basics of revenue recognition under
generally accepted accounting
principles, or “GAAP.”

Suggestions for Sales Executives
when the financial results are released publicly.

Third, in addition to contingent sales with side letters, other
methods used to overstate sales or income included: (1)
shipping products that the company knew would be
returned; (2) creating bogus sales; (3) treating goods loaned
to others on a trial or consignment basis as completed
sales; (4) shipping product to the company’s own
warehouse and recording a sale; (5) funneling cash to
customers for use as payment back to the company for the
“purchased” product; and (6) failing to record products
returned by customers. Each of these methods resulted
either in sales being recorded too early or in phony sales
being recorded.

Given the stiff criminal penalties and the SEC’s willingness
to pursue civil charges against sales executives who
participate in accounting frauds, we offer four suggestions
to help sales executives and their staff minimize their
exposure to accounting fraud allegations.
• Education. Educate yourself and your staff on revenue
recognition criteria, including the elements of Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 101 [5] and its subsequent
updates. Public company executives, whether in sales or
3 Given the time lag in the SEC’s enforcement process, many of the
alleged frauds underlying these cases preceded the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and its tougher new accounting fraud penalties, which are discussed
below. It is reasonable to expect even more stringent penalties in similar
future cases.

• Compensation. Be very careful when using incentivebased compensation that could drive people to become too
aggressive at the end of the quarter or year. For example,
bonuses and commissions that are based on quarterly or
annual sales can drive some people to hold the books
open, backdate contracts, or issue side letters to customers
so as to boost sales and maximize their compensation.
Some organizations may consider basing bonus payments
on periods that do not coincide with accounting periods
(e.g., 9/1/XX – 11/30/XX instead of the fourth quarter of
the year, 10/1/XX – 12/31/XX). In this example, even if
some people pushed too hard at 11/30/XX to get sales into
November, it is less likely that the company’s fourth quarter
results would be affected (i.e., any sales pulled from
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December up to November would still be legitimate fourth
quarter revenues). Overall, sales executives should watch
their people closely to make sure that end-of-period
manipulation of sales is not taking place and is not
rewarded by the company.
• Whistle-blowing. If you are aware of revenue
recognition issues in your company,
(a) report the problem immediately to senior management
and the board (perhaps through the company’s whistleblowing channels), and
(b) be prepared to seek employment elsewhere if the
problem is not ultimately resolved to your satisfaction.
According to Scannell and Latour [4], simply complaining to
a higher level of management and remaining with the
company may not insulate an employee from civil or
criminal liability in accounting fraud cases. Employees with
concerns about accounting issues must be willing to inform
the board and possibly even regulators (e.g., the SEC) of
the problem if management does not take appropriate
corrective action. While leaving one’s job is a painful and
costly proposition, it clearly is preferable to becoming
entangled in an accounting fraud case and facing personal
liability.
Conclusion
We encourage sales executives to educate themselves and
their staff on revenue recognition criteria and to contribute
to a culture of ethical financial reporting. What may be
viewed by some as “game playing” to reach a sales quota
may be viewed by federal prosecutors as accounting fraud
– warranting criminal prosecution. In this environment,
sales executives are wise to avoid any behavior that could
be construed as revenue fraud, to stay alert for any sign of
revenue recognition abuses by others, and to be extremely
vocal regarding any suspicions of trouble.
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Tobin College of Business launches NEW
M.S. – Taxation to meet the increasing demand
for specialists

“An M.S. in Taxation can increase
earning potential whether in
public accounting, private
companies, tax departments in
municipal governments or the
Internal Revenue Service.”
—Peter J. Tobin, former Dean,
The Peter J. Tobin College of Business
former CFO of Chase Manhatan Bank

As the demand for specialists in the field of taxation continues to increase, the need for targeted
training almost becomes a requirement of future employment. With this need in mind, St. John’s
Master of Science in Taxation program was born. Its mission is to provide tax professionals with
in-depth knowledge of the Internal Revenue Code, tax regulations, judicial decisions and Treasury
rulings. Students learn to research tax questions, facilitate tax compliance and develop tax-planning
strategies—all skills necessary for future career success.
• Our taxation faculty hold the highest academic credentials and have acquired professional
experience in leading New York City accounting and law fims.
• Extensive course selection allows for a high degree of program focus.
• Taxation internships are available with “Big Five” firms for those not currently working full time.
• Classes are held Monday-Thursday evenings and Saturdays in convenient New York Metro
locations to meet the needs of working tax professionals.
• All courses meet CPE cedit requirements in NY and NJ.
• This program is accredited by AACSB International – The Association to Advance Collegiate
Schools of Business.

Master of Science in Taxation
This intensive program allows the candidate to select tax courses that are most applicable to his or her career. The degree requires 11
upper level graduate course (31 credits). Ten of these courses are in taxation and one may be a general business elective.
Required tax courses are:
• Research and Writing
• Corporations
• Partnerships

• Estates and Gifts
• Practice and Procedure
• Research Project

The first research course (Tax Research and Writing) will be taken during the candidate’s first semester. This course is designed to prepare
the candidates for all subsequent tax courses by enabling them to research tax questions and to clearly communicate their findings.
The final research course (Research Project) will allow the candidate, with guidance from the course instructor, to research a current tax
topic and write a paper. The written work would be expected to be of publishable quality.
Elective tax courses include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Planning for High Net-Worth Individuals
Income of Trusts and Estates
Corporate Distribution/Liquidations/Reorganizations
Consolidated Tax Returns
Interstate Commerce
Foreign Operations
Compensation, Benefits and Retirement Plans

•
•
•
•
•
•

Real Estate
Financial Products
Tax-Exempt Institutions
Specialized Industries
Tax Accounting
Special Topics

The elective Business Course (three credits) allows the candidate to select one course from the offerings of the Graduate Division of the
Tobin College of Business or one additional tax course.

Admission Requirements
Candidates for admission must satisfy the following requirements:
• Possess an undergraduate or graduate degree in accounting or a related business field. Students must have completed core
business courses or must take such courses before completing the degree.
• Successful completion of the GMAT (or an appropriate alternative examination). The successful completion of the uniform certified
public accountants examination (CPA), the certified management accountants examination (CMA) or an equivalent examination
could be used in lieu of the GMAT examination.

